In March 2015 Elite Law Solicitors was created with one goal in mind - to provide a fully comprehensive and wide ranging legal advice service by local solicitors with local expertise.
On creation we incorporated HM Law Costs Draftsmen which was a company set up in 1992 by our two Senior Partners who specialise in legal costs.
In May 2017 Elite Law acquired Fulton Robertson, a well established High street Law firm in Amersham, which has allowed us to become a fully rounded private practice providing legal advice for the local community and beyond.
Our commitment to quality, combined with competitive pricing and the willingness to adopt a flexible approach to a clients’ changing needs, has allowed us to grow steadily and expand our services to include non-costs related areas including conveyancing, employment, family and wills, trusts and probate.
Buying or selling a house can be one of the most important transactions you will ever be involved in.
Salima Manji is our head of department and brings with her a wealth of experience and expertise. Sal has been a Solicitor since 1998 and there is very little she has not seen when it comes to buying and selling residential property.
Sal and her team understand where difficulties can arise and how to overcome them, ensuring the whole process is as smooth as possible. You can be assured that the advice will be clear and easy to understand giving you peace of mind throughout.
Testimonials from some of our clients:
"Thank you so much for your hard work and sleepless night, we will forever be grateful for the amazing work you did on our behalf"
"You really are a great team. I was kept informed throughout and felt a valued client"
"Well done, tenacity always pays off! What with this exchange and the completion both happening today, I’d better find some more properties for you to deal with! Many thanks and well done!"
Few legal documents are as important as your Will and we will ensure that your wishes are accurately reflected.
Our estate administration lawyers provide a comprehensive service which includes dealing with the Probate Registry, the estate debts and funeral expenses, selling estate assets, preparing the estate accounts and dealing with any inheritance tax which may be due.
Meg Wilton is our head of department and brings over 10 years of experience and expertise and has been working in private client practice in the local area since 2001. Meg and her team are here to help with any of your needs when it comes to wills, trusts and probate.
Testimonials from some of our clients:
“Simply superb, professionally treated by Meg Wilton and at a reasonable cost”
“Extremely helpful, pleasant Solicitor and staff and office smart and clean”
“Solicitor Meg Wilton has been dealing with my late father's estate and probate. I recommend her services whole heartedly. She has been sensitive, efficient and impossible to fault. Highly recommended.”
We help you through the maze of complex legal and financial issues including division of capital, maintenance, pensions and business interests. Where children are involved, we help manage decisions about their care and financial arrangements. We take time to understand your needs.
We offer supportive advice to clients whose relationships have broken down.
We do our utmost to make the whole process as amicable and painless as possible however, where necessary, we will do everything we can to make sure you are treated fairly and your future is secure.
Mediation is a flexible process that can be used to settle disputes in a whole range of situations.
Chris Dolton is our head of department. He has been a solicitor for over 30 years and has considerable knowledge and practical know- how of court proceedings, often undertaking his own advocacy and has dealt with a wide range of cases, including high value cases.
Chris is also accredited by the Family Mediation Council as a family mediator and is able to bring to the mediation process his considerable experience and knowledge as a family lawyer.
Testimonials from some of our clients:
“I found Chris Dolton very approachable and straight-forward to deal with. He gave clear, easy-to-understand advice on a specific issue I was facing. He also prepared and finalised the documentation for me in a tight time frame."
“We felt that at all times Chris and Carol explained things to us in a way which was easily understood we also felt that they always had our best interests at the forefront of any decisions that we had to make.”
“I would like to say a thank you to you, and also your team, for guiding me through this process and alleviating me of the stress of the situation. It has been greatly appreciated and I will recommend you to any one in need of similar services”
Whether you are an employer or an employee you spend the majority of your life in the workplace. As such it is important that you know what your duties and rights are and more importantly what can be done if something goes wrong.
We specialise in not only helping you if something goes wrong but also in preventing problems arising in the first instance.
Beyzade Beyzade is our employment Solicitor.
Beyzade has represented both employers and employees in the Employment Tribunal, Employment Appeal Tribunal, and in the High Court. Beyzade is not only a skilled litigator, but he also has a good track record of resolving employment disputes before they proceed to a Tribunal, and taking steps to avoid common disputes occurring within the workplace e.g. reviewing contract documents and policies.
Beyzade has higher rights of audience and is a skilled advocate which means that he can represent you from day 1 until the final hearing.
Our involvement in ground-breaking judgements means we are well-placed to advise on complex and unusual cases. Below are some of the cases our staff have dealt with: See below to read more about each case :
MESSIH v MCMILLAN WILLIAMS & ORS  EWCA Civ 844
The appellant solicitors (M) appealed against a decision that there should be no order in respect of the costs of the proceedings against them following the service by the respondent (R) of a notice of discontinuance.
R issued proceedings against his previous solicitors (L) and M. The proceedings against L were settled on terms that L paid R £21,500 and his costs. L discontinued contribution proceedings which they had served on M. M refused to agree to R discontinuing his claim against them with no order for costs. R served notice of discontinuance and applied for an order under CPR r.38.6(1) that he should not be required to pay M's costs. The judge made the order sought.
The Court held that ff CPR r.38.6 had been intended to create a general discretion as to costs on discontinuance it would have said so. As drafted, the rule made it clear that the defendant started from the position of being entitled to his costs and it was for the claimant to justify the making of some other order. The judge began his analysis by considering whether the settlement of the action against L constituted a change of circumstances which entitled the court to consider how to exercise its discretion under r.38.6(1). If the judge intended to suggest by that that there should be some kind of threshold test based on a change of circumstances then he was wrong to do so. A material change of circumstances might amount to a sufficient justification or reason for departing from the normal rule. It would depend on what the circumstances were. But the correct approach was for the court to consider all the matters relied on as justifying the making of some alternative order for costs and then to decide whether they were sufficient to support such an order.
The avoidance of the costs of a trial was the necessary consequence of any discontinuance and could not, of itself, justify a departure from the normal rule that the discontinuing party paid the other side's costs up to the date of discontinuance. There had to be something more than that to justify that departure. Otherwise the normal rule would be displaced in every case. In the instant case there was nothing more. R was therefore ordered to pay the costs of M up to the date of discontinuance.
TRACY REYNOLDS v STONE ROWE BREWER (A Firm)  EWHC 497 (QB)
The appellant firm of solicitors (S) appealed against a decision of a costs judge that it was bound by an estimate given to the respondent (R). R consulted S, who informed her that the estimated cost of taking the matter forward and through to trial would be in the region of £10,000 to £18,000 plus VAT.
Throughout the course of the litigation, S sent R a number of invoices, and then sent a letter stating that S's estimate had to be revised to £30,000 plus VAT. R had already paid S around £15,000 in line with the original estimate, but further bills were sent to her. R did not pay them, and S informed her that, as the sum of £25,000 remained outstanding, it would not act further.
The question of costs payable by R to S was referred to the costs judge. He went through all the points of dispute and concluded that S should be bound by its estimate of £18,000, to which the 15 per cent "margin" available under established case law would be added, thereby limiting R's liability for costs to £20,700,
S contended that the judge had erred in failing to take into account that the whole point of the revised estimate had been to advise R in advance of the costs being incurred that the original limit of £18,000 was going to be exceeded, and that she had treated the original estimate wrongly as a fixed quotation.
The Court held that there had been no error of law on the part of the judge of which S could complain. He had been entitled to hold that S should be bound by the estimates. The revised estimate had been an attempt to correct an earlier under-estimate and was not attributable to any change in the facts. There had been no significantly unusual developments before the revised estimate such as to explain the difference between the £18,000 estimate and the £30,000 revised estimate.
WILLIS V NICHOLSON  EWCA Civ 199
In a RTA collision case resulting in catastrophic injuries to the claimant a split trial had been ordered. At that trial the claimant had been found two thirds liable for the accident. Quantum had yet to be determined.
An application for a costs capping order was made on the basis of a claimant's estimate that some half a million pounds of base costs had been incurred to about the time of the liability trial, and a further half million or so were to be incurred to the conclusion of the quantum stage.
The judge hearing the application held that he could not find that there was a real risk of future costs being unreasonable and disproportionate, but he did feel that the defendant merited a measure of protection and ordered that the costs should not exceed the claimant's estimate, effectively capping the costs at the level of the estimate. The defendant appealed, contending that this approach was irrational.
The appeal was dismissed however the Court recognised that there was a conflict in the authorities as to the desirability of costs capping. The high costs of litigation were a matter of concern for the litigation system as a whole. One element in this was the expectations as to annual income of those who conduct litigation. It was hoped that the CPR might lead to a change in assessing costs on the basis of market rates, but that has not happened. To control costs by limiting the way in which professionals conduct litigation is a delicate matter. For these and other reasons costs capping was not an exercise to be entered upon lightly.
IAN BOTHAM V IMRAN KHAN NIAZI (SUED AS IMRAN KHAN): ALLAN JOSEPH LAMB V IMRAN KHAN NIAZI (SUED AS IMRAN KHAN)  EWHC 2602 (QB)
Judgment in the main action was given in favour of the defendant and in 1996 C was ordered to pay K's costs. In 2003 K served a bill of costs and N252. C submitted that (1) an appropriate sanction for breach of the obligation to commence the detailed assessment (DA) within 3 months was the disallowance of all of K's costs; (2) the delay had caused C prejudice such that there could no longer be a fair DA; (3) the likely outcome of the DA was that K would be found liable to pay a net amount of costs to C; (4) K's bill of costs did not comply with the rules.
The Court held: (1) To impose the sanction of disallowance on the ground of misconduct would be disproportionate. C did not avail themselves of the right to apply for an order requiring K to commence detailed assessment within a specified period. (2) The delay had not prevented a fair DA of K's costs although the process would be more difficult than if it had been carried out on a timely basis. (3) It was impossible to conclude that K's proceedings served no useful purpose because there would be a net balance of costs due to C. (4) K's bill of costs was valid and in compliance with the relevant rules. Even if there was a technical non-compliance it would have reasonable justification and would not be a sound basis for the imposition of sanctions for misconduct.